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JOINT AND MUTUAL WILLS:
1VUTUAL PROMISES TO DEVISE AS A MEANS
OF CONVEYANCING
WILLIAm L. EAGLETON*
In property and testamentary fields, the common law has suf-
fered from the lack, or non-use, of a conveyancing tool capable of
filling the gap between the property settlement deed and the will.
That this deficiency is being remedied is attested by the remarkable
number of reported cases in the last three decades, involving joint,
simultaneous, and mutual wills in combination with contracts
restricting the privilege of revoking them.1
In Continental Europe, these instruments have for centuries
been in common use. There have been several varieties, some
emphasizing the contract with its flexibility in carrying out the
particular intention of the parties, and others more nearly resem-
bling the will with its rigid formalism.2 The contractual gift causa
mortis (Gemdchte, Geschdfte, Gelfibde) of the early middle ages was
the forerunner of both the will and the contract of inheritance, 3
and out of the latter the joint will emerged in the fourteenth cen-
tury.4 Its growth in different countries has not been uniform. As
its main and often exclusive use was by husband and wife, the
development of community ownership crowded it out in France, and
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
1In the last twenty years alone, there have been over seventy-five cases involv-
ing the enforcement of the contract connected with such wills. In the entire
period before I9OO there was a total of less than twenty, over half of which were
decided in the last dozen years of that period. Warnings against the -use of these
instruments, because of their newness, were prevalent as late as 1911 (note, 136
Am. St. Rep. 592).
The legal contests lag many years behind the current practice in the execution
of wills. A casual inquiry among attorneys indicates that these instruments are,
now being used even more than the recent flood of cases would indicate, the
encouraging tendency being to state the terms of the contract in writing.
The interest aroused by the recent cases is shown by the large number of
articles, notes, and comments in both the English and the American law reviews
and periodicals. The leading articles are: Costigan, Constructive Trusts (1915) 28
HARv. L. REV. 237, 247; Drake, Contracts to Will All Property (1909) 7 MIcH. L.
REv. 318; Goddard, Mutual Wills (I9!9) 17 MIcH. L. REv. 677; Partridge,
Revocability of Mutual Wills (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 357.
2HUEBNER, HISTORY OF GErmANY'S PRIVATE LAW (2d ed. 1913), translated
in 4 CONTINENTAL LEGAL HISTORY SERIES (1918) § 112, pp. 74o-754, especially
PP. 753, 754-
3 lbid. 746. 4 lbid. 753.
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it was finally forbidden by the Ordinance of 1735. 5 In Germany,
on the other hand, its existence in some form has been continuous
throughout these many centuries, and the Civil Code of igoo author-
izes and codifies both the mutual testament 6 (restricted in use to
husband and wife) and the mutual contract of inheritance.' In
Scotland the "mutual settlement" is apparently still in common use. 8
In contrast with that ancient usage in neighboring countries,
the common law was very slow in developing this field. Perhaps
the reason was the practical one that the status of the married
woman prevented its employment in the most common case, by
husband and wife. There appears to have been no difficulty, except
lack of precedent, in the way of its use and development by others,
since the component parts, the will and the contract to devise,
existed in the law. Two persons certainly could have executed
separate wills, if they could not also have combined the two in one
"joint" will. And they could have executed a contract, each promis-
ing to keep his will in force (i.e., to devise his property in the manner
provided in his will).
However, such a contract containing similar promises to devise
by each of the parties was almost unknown to the conveyancer
until the last fifty years. True, such a contract was enforced in
Dufour v. Pereira9 in 1769, but in that case foreigners had executed
a joint will in accordance with the practice in their native country,10
and Lord Camden was struck by "the novelty of the thing". The
contemporary discussion of that case by Francis Hargrave11 shows
the clear understanding of the problem by that noted barrister;
5BEISSAUD, HISTORY OF FRENCH PRIVATE LAW (2d ed. I9O8), translated in 3
CONTINENTAL LEGAL HISTORY SERIES (1912) § 498, P. 702, and § 505, p. 712.
This ban has been repeated in the Napoleonic Code, the Swiss Civil Code, and
in some other codes. See LA. REV. Civ. CODE (Merrick, 19oo) art. 1572 (1565);
Oreline v. Heirs of Haggerty, 12 La. Ann. 880 (1857); Wood v. Roane, 35 La. Ann.
856 (1883); Ervin v. Shelby's Heirs, 146 La. 573, 83 So. 835 (1920).
Does the large number of joint and mutual will cases recently reported in
states having community property indicate that Brissaud's reason is erroneous,
or that modern society, by complicating community property problems, has
produced a need for these instruments in such states?
6Sections 2268-2273.
7Sections 2274-2302, especially § 2298.
8(1876) 20 JOUR. JUR. 558; (1880) 24 JOUR. JUR. 23. For the Roman-Dutch
law, see Denyssen v. Mostert, L. R. 4 P. C. 236 (1872), on appeal to the Privy
Council from the colony of the Cape of Good Hope.
9I Dick. 419, 2 HARG. JURID. ARG. 272, 304, 2 HARG. ExER. 70, 100 (1769).
10See Walpole v. Orford, 3 Ves. Jr. 402, 417, 4 Rev. Rep. 38, 3o Eng. Reprt.
1076 (1797) (for this case see also 2 HARG. JURID. ARG. 272, 2 HARG. EXER. 70).
"Supra note 9.
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yet it was not until near the close of the last century that we find
another reported case wherein such a contract was enforced. 2 The
intervening period of 120 years had produced a few cases involving
and discussing the contract,'3 but its main problem was the validity
of the joint will as a will. That preliminary problem was strenuously
contested, and though unanimity has probably now been reached, 14
it was not until the last seventy years that a respectable number of
states held that a joint will could be good as the separate will of
each testator. 5
2Carmichael v. Carmichael, 72 Mich. 76, 40 N. W. 173, I L. R. A. 596, 16
Am. St. Rep. 528 (1888); Turnipseed v. Sirrine, 57 S. C. 559, 35 S. E. 757, 76
Am. St. Rep. 580 (I899). In Eldred v. Warner, I Ariz. 175 (1875), a contract
of this type was enforced though no will was executed or considered necessary
by the parties (see infra note 30). To these might be added Duvale v. Duvale,
54 N. J. Eq. 581, 35 AtI. 750 (1896); Allen v. Boomer, 82 Wis. 364, 52 N. W. 426
(1892). In McGuire v. McGuire, 74 Ky. I42 (1874), the contract was not, as
such, enforced, but its existence aided in proving undue influence. Breathitt v.
Whittaker, 47 Ky. 530 (1856) was not a "joint will" of the type discussed in
this article.
3Before igoo, the following cases rejected the contract as not proved: Robin-
son v. Mandell, Fed. Cas. No. 11, 959,3 Cliff. 169 (D. Mass. 1868); Schumaker
v. Schmidt, 44 Ala. 454, 4 Am. Rep. 135 (1870); Gould v. Mansfield, 103 Mass.
408, 4 Am. Rep. 573 (1869); Drischler v. Van Den Henden, 49 N.Y. Super. Ct.
5o8 (1883); Gooding v. Brown, 35 Hun 148 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1885); Edson v.
Parsons, 155 N. Y. 555, 5o N.E. 265, 3 Prob. Rep. Ann. 178 (1898); Uniontown
Reformed Church v. Wise, 17 Ohio C. C. 659, 6 Ohio C. D. 703 (1896); In re
Cawley's Estate, 136 Pa. 628, 2o AtI. 567, io L.R.A. 93 (1890); Izard v. Middle-
ton, i Desauss. Eq. I16 (S.C. 1785); Hale v. Hale, go Va. 728, I9 S.E. 739 (1894);
Walpole v. Orford, supra note io. See also Everdell v. Hill, 58 App. Div. 151, 68
N. Y. Supp. 719 (ist Dept. i9OI), aff'd without opinion, 17o N. Y. 581, 63 N.E.
1II6 (1902), reV'g 27 Misc. 285, 58 N.Y. Supp. 447 (Sup. Ct. 1899). The follow-
ing cases denied the particular relief requested: Sumner v. Crane, 155 Mass. 483,
29 N.E. Ix51, 15 L.R.A. 447 (1892); Matter of Keep, i Counoly 104,2 N. Y. Supp.
205 (Surr. Ct. 1888); Bynum v. Bynum, 33 N. C. 632 (*85o); Hobson v. Black-
burn, I Addams, Eccl. Rep. 274 (1822).
4Ohio may possibly be contra. See Betts v. Harper and Walker v. Walker,
both infra note I5.
15For early English and American cases, see In re Stracey and Stracey, i
Deane& Swa. 6 (1855); In re Lovegrove, 8 Jur. (N.s.) 442, 31 L.J.P. (N.s.) 87,
6 L. T. (N.S.) 131, 2 Swa. & Tr. 453 (1862); In re Piazzi-Smyth [1898] P. 7,67
L.J.P. (N.S.) 4,77 L.T. (N.s.) 375 (1897); Lewis v. Scofield, 26 Conn. 452,68
Am. Dec. 404 (1857); Evans v. Smith, 28 Ga. 98, 73 Am. Dec. 751 (1858); Black
v. Richards, 95 Ind. 184 (1883); Murphy v. Black, 41 Iowa 488 (1875); Ex parte
Day, i Bradf. 476 (N. Y. Surr. Ct. 1851); In re Diez, 50 N. Y. 88 (1872); In re
Davis, 12o N. C. 9, 26 S. E. 636, 58 Am. St. Rep. 771, 38 L.R.A. 289, 2 Prob.
Rep. Ann. 198 (1897), overruling Clayton v. Liverman, 19 N. C. 588 (1837);
Betts v. Harper, 39 Ohio St. 639, 48 Am. Rep. 477 (1884), limiting Walker v.
Walker, 14 Ohio St. 157, 82 Am. Dec. 474 (1862). Also see infra notes 33, 34-
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Our vocabulary in this field has been affected by this historical
subservience of the contract problem to the wills problem. Although
the c6ntract is at least as important as the wills, 16 the problems of
law arising from the use of these instruments are usually discussed
under the general term "joint and mutual wills". There is no word
of art restricted in definition to the contractual double or multiple
will;17 the instruments are designated only with reference to their
physical appearance or contents as wills, and the terms are applied
regardless of the existence or nonexistence of a contract restricting
their revocability.
As opposed to "separate wills", a "joint will" is one where the
same instrument is made the will of two or more testators, each
of whom signs and executes it. Separate wills may be called "simul-
taneous" if they are executed as parts of one transaction. Either
separate or joint wills are "reciprocal" or "mutual"' 8 if each con-
tains a substantial bequest or devise to the other testator, either in
fee or for life.
While these nAmes are at times very useful, it is necessary to
note again that they are based on the characteristics and contents
of the wills, and not on the existence or provisions of the contract.
In determining the contractual intention of the parties,, the type
of will may have some evidentiary value, but there are also many
additional, and often more important, items of evidence available.
Can it be possible that the mere form of the wills alone reveals, to
any considerable degree of accuracy, the contractual intention of
the parties? Certainly the courts, in discussing the contract, do carry
out the intention of the parties as shown by all the evidence. Yet
the result of the individual case is too commonly summarized as a
dogmatic rule based entirely upon the form of the wills. The Illinois
Supreme Court, in the case of Frazier v. Patterson,"9 went so far
as to recite, by way of dictum, a whole series, of such arbitrary rules
purporting to solve every problem in this whole field. Though these
rules are often inconsistent and uniformly ignored when they fail
"'The contract alone is essential to our method of conveyancing; the wills
result from the performance of the contract and are therefore present when the
contract is not broken, but their absence is merely a breach of the contract.
See infra notes 30, 36.
1Professor Goddard, op. cit. supra note i, has suggested the use of the word
"mutual", and there is some authority for that use. However, "mutual" is
used so often in these cases as synonomous with "reciprocal" that any such
restricted use of the word might cause confusion.
"sSee supra note 17.
19243 Ill. 8o, 9o N. E. 216, 27 L.R.A. (N.s.) 5o8, 17 AN. CAs. 1003 (19o9).
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to carry out the proved intention of the parties, they have often
been quoted and approved, and a warning must be given against
them.
The Supreme Court of Kansas recently uttered such a warning.
In ig9 that court 0 had approved Frazier v. Patterson,2' especially
where it glibly explains why there must necessarily be a contract
affecting the revocability of every joint and mutual will: "[W]here
the parties execute their wills by the same instrument, it is not
possible that such course could be adopted without some previous
understanding or agreement between them."22 Five years later,
when confronted with that statement in another joint and mutual
will case, that same Kansas court courageously faced it and said:
"This assertion lay beyond the boundary of the court's information.
Such a thing [a joint and mutual will without a contract] is not only
possible, but occurred in the case now under decision... Non-
existence of a contract... was proved by plaintiff and by defendant,
and the case stands as a warning against dogmatic judicial declara-
tion that a certain form necessarily expresses a certain reality. '23
Some of the other arbitrary rules of Frazier v. Patterson will be specifi-
cally noticed later; but this warning against such dogmatic rules
based entirely on the form of the wills should be kept in mind in
studying any of the problems involving the contract.
CONTRACTS TO DEVISE
While the contract to devise is neither new nor uncommon in
our law, a hurried mention of some of the well settled principles
may facilitate the study of our problem.2 4 The typical case is the
promise to devise made by an aged person as consideration for a
promise to support or care for him during his declining years. Though
the agreement is commonly called a contract to make a will, the
important and often the only promise is that the property will
be devised in the manner agreed upon.2 Except as the doctrine
20Lewis v. Lewis, 104 Kan. 269, 178 Pac. 421 (i929).2 Supra note i9, at 86, 90 N. E. at 218.
uThat idea is rephrased in the Lewis case, supra note 2o, at 273, 178 Pac. at
423: "How could such a will be voluntarily executed if there was no agreement
or understanding that it would be made? The will itself, its terms, and its execu-
tion, are evidence that such a contract was made.'
nMenke v. Duwe, 117 Kan. 207, 217, 220, 230 Pac. 1065, 1070, 1071 (1924).
24For discussions and citations see: i PAGE, WiLLS (2d ed. 1926) 156-169;
Costigan, op. cit. supra note I, at 241; Schnebly, Contracts to Make Testamentary
Dispositions as Affected by the Statute of Frauds (1926) 24 MIcH. L. REV. 749.
210f course the subsidiary promises that he shall execute or refrain from revok-
ing the will may exist, but their breach involves only nominal damages, as the
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of anticipatory breach is applied, such a promise is broken only
at death, and the Statute of Limitations starts running at that time.
The difficulty of disproving this type of contract has made per-
jured evidence particularly dangerous; yet only a few states have
special statutes requiring a writing. However, the ordinary Statute
of Frauds has generally been held to apply to promises to devise real
property, although not to promises to bequeath personal property.
There is considerable disagreement on such questions as the suffi-
ciency of a will, not mentioning the promise, as a memorandum of
the contract; or the efficacy of personal services as a part performance
to take the promise out of the Statute in equity.
As the property promised to be devised is usually unique and the
exact amount of damages difficult to ascertain, the common remedy
for a breach of the promise is a bill in equity against the heirs or
devisees for specific performance. 2  An action may be brought at
law (claim filed against the estate) on the contract, or if that is
will itself is ambulatory and creates no rights until the death of the testator
leaving it in force.
216The statement has often been made that this is not technically specific per-
formance, "since there is no attempt to compel the promisor to make a will".
I PAGE, op. cit. supra note 24, at 192. That is merely a quibble over the definition
of the legal term "specific performance". A legal term is merely a name given
to a group or category created by some classification. To decide a case or to
determine a legal definition by the popular meaning or etymology of the term
is to put the cart before the horse. The first problem is the creation of the clas-
sification; the next is the selection of a word or words to designate each of the
various groups. A classification is tested by its usefulness in practice. In select-
ing a name for a group, sometimes a new word is coined, but usually a familiar
word that can be remembered is used in spite of the defect that the etymological
or popular definition seldom exactly fits the legal group.
What classification and terminology have been or should be used here?
Certainly we have a group of cases wherein the promisee gets the legal interests
for which he contracted, rather than a money judgment, and the cases in that
group have enough common characteristics to make it useful to have a name for
them. Perhaps a better name might have been found than "specific performance",
but that is the name in common use, and the names of legal categories seldom
come very near to perfection. Those objecting to this broad use apparently
think that this group of cases should be divided into two sub-groups, one called
"specific performance", where the litigation results in exact performance, and
the other called "quasi-specific performance", or one type of "constructive
trust" (see infra note ioo), where the chancellor can put the promisee only
approximately in the position he would have been in if the promisor had not
breached the promise. What useful purpose would be served by this classifi-
cation? And where would the line be drawn between the two sub-groups?
Professor Costigan, op. cit. supra note i, at 244, n. I5, admits that the
"quasi-specific performance" sub-group would also contain the cases where an
ordinary contract for the sale of land is enforced in equity against the vendor's
heirs or grantee, since the exact instrument contracted for is not executed.
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barred by the Statute of Frauds, in a quasi-contractual action for
the value of the services rendered. Occasionally injunctive relief
is granted against the promisor himself during his lifetime if he is
threatening to dispose of the property in such a way that it might
reach the hands of a bona fide purchaser.
The contract, even if in writing, will require interpretation and
construction by the court. There may be express conditions, in-
cluding those often called "implied in fact". There may also be
constructive or "implied in law" conditions, based partly upon
the court's idea of justice and partly upon what probably would
have been the intention of the parties if they had foreseen the subse-
quent events. These latter "court made" conditions are to be found
in all types of contract cases, but here they commonly pass as in-
stances where the court of equity will not give relief that would
lead to unfortunately harsh results. The statement has been made
that the law courts have not the power to withhold the legal remedy
for such a reason.27 While in some types of cases the chancellor
may refuse his extraordinary relief though damages would be granted
at law, yet constructive conditions may be imposed by either court
to prevent a recovery that would be harsh and inequitable. Thus,
if the promisor marries and refuses to accept further support from
the promisee, and later dies leaving a dependent widow and small
children, the law court can take care of that unforeseen situation
by a constructive condition to the effect that such operative facts
shall result in a discharge of the contract, with merely a quasi-
contractual claim for services actually rendered.28
Would it also include the cases where the decree results in a master's deed, or
no deed at all? The chancellor never gives exact performance of affirmative
promises; there is always at least a difference of time. LANGDELL, A BRIEF
SUtvEy OF EQUITY JURISDICTION (2d ed. 1908) 40; also to be found in (1888)
i HAav. L. REv. 355.
27Costigan, op. cit. supra note I, at 245, n. I8.
28Sargent v. Corey, 34 Calif. App. 193, 166 Pac. io2i (1917). The leading
case involving only a marriage is Owens v. McNally, 113 Calif. 444, 45 Pac.
710 (1896). In Bedal v. Johnson, 37 Idaho 359, 218 Pac. 641 (x923), the defend-
ant married the promisor without notice of the contract. After overlooldng
entirely the possibility of conditions, the court stated: "Uniformly such con-
tracts as would deprive the subsequent spouse of her ordinary rights of inheritance
as a widow have been declared unenforceable." Such over-broad statements,
often framed as rules of law, are altogether too common. That such contracts
will be enforced when not unjust, see Mayfield v. Cook, 2oi Ala. 187, 77 So. 713
(1918); Rundell v. McDonald, 41 Calif. App. i75, 182 Pac. 450 (i919); Dillon v.
Gray, 87 Kan. 129, 123 Pac. 878 (1912); Ruck v. Ruck, 159 Mich. 23r, 124 N. W.
52 (i909); Kloberg v. Teller, 1o3 Misc. 641, 171 N. Y. Supp. 947 (Sup. Ct. 1918);
Burdine v. Burdine, 98 Va. 515, 36 S.E. 992 (i9oo). On conditions in contracts,
see authorities cited infra note 45.
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ANALYSIS OF "JOINT AND MUTUAL WILLS"
In the method of conveyancing that is the subject of this article,
one person promises that, at least under certain conditions, he will
devise part or all of his property in a certain manner in exchange
for a similar promiseby one or more other persons. That is a good
contract; it differs from the usual contract to devise only in that
the consideration running from each of the parties is a promise to
devise. At the time of entering into the contract the parties usually
execute wills which, if left unrevoked, will carry out that agreement;
but the contract and wills are separate legal acts, and the validity of
each is determined by its own rules.
First a few words as to the wills. In most cases they are exactly
coextensive with the contract, providing only for the promised
devises. But the validity of the contract is not affected if the wills
should provide for only part of those devises, 29 just as it is not
affected by the failure to execute any wills at all.30 Likewise the
wills may provide for additional devises not covered by any promise
not to revoke,31 just as there may be and often are joint or simul-
taneous wills when there is no contract.
Each will is governed by the rules applicable to ordinary wills,
whether or not there is a contract.32 When the wills are separate,
29Meador v. Manlove, 97 Kan. 7o6, I56 Pac. 731 (I916); Lugauer v. Husted,
228 Mich. 76, I99 N. W. 682 (1924); Morgan v. Sanborn, 225 N. Y. 454, 122 N.E.
696 (I919); Torgerson v. Hauge, 34 N.D. 646, 159 N.W. 6 (i916). See also
(where contract not enforced for sufficient reasons) Everdell v. Hill, supra
note i3; In re Arland, 131 Wash. 297, 230 Pac. 157 (1924).
8Cases where wills never executed: Eldred v. Warner, supra note 12; Mueller
v. Batcheler, 131 Iowa 65o, IO9 N.W. 186 (I9O6); Fleming v. Fleming, 194
Iowa 71, 174 N.W. 946 (1919); s.c., 194 Iowa 104, i8o N.W. 2o6 (1920); s.c., 194
Iowa 122, 184 N.W. 296 (1921), writ of error dismissed, 264 U.S. 29, 44 Sup. Ct.
246 (1924); Green v. Whaley, 271 Mo. 636, 197 S.W. 355 (1917); Izard v. Middle-
ton, supra note I3; Stuckey v. Truett, 124 S.C. 122, 117 S.E. 192 (1923). See also
Mayfield v. Cook, supra note 28; Cox v. Hutto, 216 Ala. 232, 113 So. 40 (1927).
Also, the wills need not be simultaneous. Chase v. Stevens, 34 Calif. App. 98,
166 Pac. IO35 (1917); Meador v. Manlove, supra note 29; Anderson v. Ander-
son, 181 Iowa 578, 164 N.W. io42 (1917). Nor need they be executed at the time
the contract was made. Stewart v. Todd, I9O Iowa 283, 173 N.W. 619 (1919).
3'Uniontown Reformed Church v. Wise, supra note x3. Thus the contract
may provide for an equal division between two sets of relatives, the survivor
having power to appoint in a different manner within one or both of those groups.
Was that true in Morgan v. Sanborn, supra note 29, and Wallace v. Wallace,
216 N. Y. 28, 1o9 N.E. 872 (i915)?
32 The three following paragraphs discuss some characteristics of the will
which are not changed by the contract, including its revocability (see infra
notes 36, Io5). As to lapsing of legacies, see Brown v. Brown, ioi Kan. 335, 166
Pac. 499 (1917). As to ademption of legacies, see Donaldson's Estate, ui Pa.
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but few special obstacles are encountered ifi these rules. However,
a joint will has this peculiar difficulty: one writing is the will of two
persons, and as such it must be capable of taking effect at two dif-
ferent times. An instrument is the will of the one executing it only
if it is to take effect at his death. Often a joint will is worded as
though it were to take effect at the same time for both testators.
A liberal interpretation can usually save such an instrument. If
the property of each is devised as of the death of the survivor, it
may be interpreted, as to the first to die, as taking effect as his will
at his death, but with the possession postponed, the intervening
estate for the life of the survivor going by intestacy if it is not dis-
posed of by the will." If, on the other hand, the possession of the
property of each is to pass to the beneficiaries at the death of the
first to die, it is possible to carry out this intention in connection
with the property of the survivor by interpreting it as an attempted
lease or contract, or offer for such a lease, for the period of time
between the deaths of the two 'parties, and also as his will to take
effect at his death. 4 In construing an instrument that might be
either a deed or a will, the courts are generally anxious to carry out
the ultimate intention of the maker. In joint wills, most of the
recent cases have been similarly liberal, while some earlier cases were
not so favorable to them.35
Joint wills, and occasionally separate wills, have encountered
some difficulty due to a common failure to understand clearly the
CO. Ct. 311 (1892). Since the rules as to undue influence and fraud are different,
the will may be good but the contract bad. Mullen v. Johnson, 157 Ala. 262, 47
So. 584 (19o8). Cases overlooking the distinction between the wills and the
contract are discussed in connection with Martin v. Helms, infra note 114.
33Moore v. Samuelson, 107 Kan. 744, 193 Pac. 369 (1920); Graham v. Graham,
297 Mo. 290, 249 S.W. 37 (1923); In re Stracey and Stracey, supra note 15. See
also, Cole v. Shelton, x69 Ark. 695, 276 S.W. 993, 43 A.L.R. OO8 (1925), which
is directly in point even if the opinion is correct in stating that it is not a joint will.
Compare Bright v. Cox, 147 Ga. 474, 94 S.E. 572 (1917).
34Kirtley v. Spencer, 222 S.W. 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 192o). The validity of
such a will may arise in a contest of the instrument as the will of the first to die.
It seems that the contestants would win on an interpretation that the instru-
ment was to become effective for this testator at the death of the first to die
even though the other party should actually die first. Most definitions of a will
include the requirement that it is to take effect at the death of the testator, if
at all. But the contest would be decided in favor of the proponents if the instru-
ment is interpreted as suggested in the text. See Gerbrich v. Freitag, 213 11. 552,
73 N.E. 338, 104 Am. St. Rep. 234, 2 ANN. CAS. 24 (1905).
"Compare cases supra note 33 with: Hershy v. Clark, 35 Ark. 17,37 Am. Rep. i
(1879); State Bank v. Bliss, 67 Conn. 317, 35 Atl. 255, I Prob. Rep. Ann. 578
(1896). See also Epperson v. White, 156 Tenn. 155, 299 S.W. 812 (1927).
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difference between the wills and the contract. Each will is a uni-
lateral act, and its execution creates no rights in the devisees, as
the will is revocable (ambulatory) until the death of the testator.
On the contrary, the contract is a bilateral act, and it contains the
promise of each party which creates the right, in the other testator
or in some third party, that the promisor shall make the promised
devises and shall not revoke them.36
The validity of the will is decided when it is offered for probate.
The presence of the contract does not dispense with the statutory
requirements of a valid execution; nor does it take away the capacity
to revoke. The instrument should not be probated if it was not
properly executed, or if it was revoked. But the revocation or the
failure to execute would be a breach of the promise to devise, and
the promisee or beneficiary would have his action on the contract,
either at law for damages, or, more commonly, in equity against the
heirs or devisees for specific performance.
Because the contract creates the rights upon which those actions
are based, it is much more important than the wills, which are merely
the means of carrying out the promises. Before taking up the difficult
problem of determining the existence and terms of the contract, the
legal structure created by such a contract will be analyzed.
The most important characteristic of this conveyancing tool is
its flexibility. The possible varieties of promises and conditions
are innumerable; they can satisfy the most unusual wants of the
parties. Two common but very dissimilar cases may serve as exam-
ples.
(i) Two spinster sisters live together. Not only is each willing
to devise all her property to the other, but she wants to be certain
that the other does the same for her if she is the survivor. Mutual
wills can be executed in accordance with a contract containing mutual
promises to devise to the other in fee, the survivor to have the
"Of course such testator still has the power to revoke his will just as almost
every promisor has the power to break his promise; but the contract has affected
the privilege, the promisor being under a duty not to revoke. As a probating
problem, the revoking instrument should be probated; the promisee's remedy is
on the contract. Allen v. Bromberg, 147 Ala. 317, 41 So. 771, 12 Prob. Rep.
Ann. 144 (19o6); In re Anderson, Houck v. Anderson, 14 Ariz. 502, x3i Pac. 975
(1913); Estate of Rolls, 193 Calif. 594, 226 Pac. 608 (1924); Sumner v. Crane,
supra note I3; Tooker v. Vreeland, 92 N. J. Eq. 340, 112 Atl. 665 (1921), aff'd sub-
nom. Tooker v. Maple, 93 N. J. Eq. 224, 115 At] . 25 (1921); Matter of Keep,
supra note i3; Kloberg v. Teller, supra note 28; hermann v. Ludwig, infra note
55; In re Burke, 66 Ore. 252, 134 Pac. II (1913); In re Edwall, 75 Wash. 391, 134
Pac. 1041 (1913); Hobson v. Blackburn, supra note 13. But see infra notes io6,
io8.
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privilege of disposing of all by deed or will as she pleases. Compare
the result with that obtained by the use of wills alone or, on the
other hand, deeds of conveyance. The will alone could be revoked
secretly by the testatrix so that, without a contract, neither party
would have the desired protection. A deed would cut down the
grantor's estate so that she could not dispose of the fee even if
in need. The arrangement would be inflexible, with no implied
conditions to take care of unexpected subsequent events. But by
the contractual wills, the complete estate is retained subject only
to the duty to devise in accordance with the promise. And those
promises will be tempered by constructive conditions taking care
of the unexpected.
Perhaps two observations should be made on this particular, type
of case where the contract is merely mutual, i. e. for the benefit of
the survivor: (a) it is in its nature awagering, or at least aleatory,
contract, and something similar to an insurable interest may be
required;37 and (b) often the courts have not favored such a con-
tract and have demanded very convincing proof of its existence,
perhaps because of its gambling nature.3 8
(2) In the second example, an aged but childless couple have
separate estates. Each spouse considers the other as the natural
object of his bounty. But if the husband should die leaving every-
thing to the wife in fee, her relatives would take all at her death,
to the exclusion of his relatives. If he left her only a life estate, she
could not dispose of the property if she found the income insufficient
to live on. Powers have not proved entirely satisfactory, especially
with personal property, and the use of trustees increases the cost
materially. And under any such scheme the division between
the two sets of heirs might result in a great inequality. Here again
the most satisfactory arrangement will be the use of a contract to
devise by mutual wills, which can provide that the survivor shall
have all in fee, and at his death the combined estate shall be divided
equally or otherwise between the two groups of kindred. Under such
37See the well-considered case of Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 240 Pac. 927,
43 A.L.R. IOlO (1925). This was also suggested in Anderson v. Anderson, supra
note 30.
38For an extreme case, see Schumaker v. Schmidt, 44 Ala. 454, 4 Am. Rep. 135
(1870). In that case, however, there was no insurable interest (the parties were
merely friends), and in the absence of authority for refusing relief on that ground,
the court took the easier but more dubious path of interpreting the facts to the
effect that there was no contract, in spite of the fact that the joint and mutual
will itself mentioned consideration and contained such expressions as "do mutu-
ally promise", and "this is the mutual agreement of us". For a more complete
discussion of this type of case, see infra pp. 384-5 and notes 100-104.
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a plan the survivor's needs will be taken care of by receiving the
complete fee,39 restricted only by the duty not to make excessive
gifts or otherwise attempt to disappoint the ultimate beneficiaries. 40
The contract in this case has a quite different object than the
contract in the first illustration, and it will therefore have different
promises and conditions. The primary intent of the parties is to
prevent the unfair distribution between the two sets of relatives
that would result if the survivor revoked after receiving the bequest
from the first to die. There will therefore be the promise, as survivor,
not to revoke after accepting the benefits from the other's will.
But there may be conditions allowing a revocation under some other
circumstances. To prevent an immediate vested interest in the
third party beneficiaries, 4' the parties will certainly include a condi-
tion permitting a revocation of the wills and termination of the con-
tract rights by the mutual agreement of the two. And the main
object in this case will be carried out even if each testator alone
retains the privilege of revoking upon giving sufficient notice for
the other to revoke his will also. Perhaps the parties in this type of
case usually intend that each shall be at least that free to terminate
the whole agreement. At any rate, the courts have favored such
39This seems so fundamental it is seldom questioned. See Sage v. Sage, 230
Mich. 477, 203 N.W. 90 (1925); Roy v. Pos, 183 Calif. 359, 191 Pac. 542 (1920);
Smith v. McHenry, ii Kan. 659, 207 Pac. n1o8 (1922); Phillips v. Murphy, 186
Ky. 763, 218 S.W. 250 (1920); Rastetter v. Honinger, 214 N. Y. 66, 1o8 N.E. 210
(igiS). However, a few cases contain discussions that indicate some confusion
on this point. Schumaker v. Schmidt, supra note 38; Klussman v. Wessling, 238
Ill. 568, 87 N.E. 544 (19o9); Baker v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N.W. 998 (Igio).
There are also several offending cases decided by the Texas Courts of Civil
Appeals, but the two cases by the Texas Supreme Court are more satisfactory.
Wyche v. Clapp, 43 Tex. 543 (1875); Heller v. Heller, 114 Tex. 401, 269 S.W. 771
(1925); cf. Ginn v. Edmundson, 173 N.C. 85, 91 S.E. 696 (1917).
4 0Rastetter v. Honinger, supra note 39; Williams v. Williams, 123 Va. 643, 96
S.E. 749 (I918). See also Wright v. Wright, 215 Ky. 394, 285 S.W. I88 (1926);
Van Duyne v. Vreeland, 12 N.J. Eq. 142 (1858); Bruce v. Moon, 57 S.C. 6o,
35 S.E. 415 (1899); Harris v. Morgan, infra note 77. That seems to be the
intention in the usual contracts. Of course the parties can vary the contract in
this respect.
41As to the rights of a third party beneficiary in case of an attempted release or
rescission by the parties to the contract where there is no such condition, see I
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §§ 395-397. Of course, if the ultimate beneficiary
is a party to the contract and is furnishing consideration (as support), there would
be no such condition giving the devisors the privilege of rescinding. Torgerson v.
Hauge, supra note 29. Compare (wills never executed) Cox v. Hutto, supra note
3o; Mayfield v. Cook, supra note 28. For similar mutual will contracts, but
involving different questions, see In re McGinley's Estate, 257 Pa. 478, IOI Atl.
807 (1917); Harris v. Harris, 276 S.W. 964 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
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an interpretation,4 and apparently no objection has been made to
such conditions.4
Those two illustrations are only two of an almost indefinitely
large number of different types of schemes of testamentary distribu-
tion, and schemes of restricting by contract the privilege of chang-
ing the devises. The problem of determining the plan of testamentary
distribution is simplified by the requirement that the will, with all
its conditions, must be in writing. But the contract, in spite of its
greater importance, is much more difficult to interpret. In the per-
plexing cases that reach the appellate courts, there is often no written
memorandum of the contract; and even when it is in writing there
may be "implied in fact" and constructive conditions. The result
is that perhaps our most difficult problem is to determine whether a
contract exists, and what its promises and conditions are.
INTERPRETING THE CONTRACT
Is there a contract? And what are its terms? Those two questions
might be asked separately in solving a particular case, but many of
the reported opinions discuss only the first and perhaps assume
that if there is a contract there can be only the unconditional promise
that the wills shall not be revoked or changed. Such opinions over-
look the possibilities in the contract. The promises may cover only
a few of the devises in a will, or there may be promises to make
important devises not mentioned in the wills. As extreme examples
of those two variations between the wills and the contract, there
may be joint or simultaneous wills without any contract, or there
may be a contract when the wills were executed at a later time or
were never executed, or even when the parties thought that wills
were not necessary.-
Not only may the promises differ from the devises in plan or in
extent, but also there may be conditions in the contract which may,
under some circumstances, relieve the promisor of the duty to devise
in the manner provided in the will or promise. In all types of con-
4The dictum of Frazier v. Patterson, as cited infra note ioo, has been approved
by dictum in several other cases. Also see infra note 104.
43The objection apparently has never been raised that these conditions might
make the contract illusory. Some conditions certainly would not, as the one
allowing revocation by the survivor if he renounces the bequest to him in the will
of the first to die (a choice between two detriments), or the one allowing revoca-
tion if sufficient notice is given to allow the other party a reasonable opportunity
to revoke his will also. But see infra note IOO for a discussion of one condition
that would make the promise illusory. See also Patterson, Mlusory Promises and
Promisor's Options (1921) 6 IowA L. BULL. 129, 209.
"Supra notes 29, 30, 31.
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tracts perhaps the least understood problems are those dealing with
conditions. Our type of contract is no exception. A condition has
been defined as a fact or event which, unless excused, (a) must
exist or occur before a duty .of immediate performance of a promise
arises (condition precedent), or (b) will extinguish such a duty
after it has arisen (condition subsequent). An "express condition"
is a condition that is such because a promise or agreement so pro-
vides; this includes what are often called "conditions implied in
fact". No particular form of words is necessary in order to make a
promise expressly conditional. Whether it is expressly conditional, and
if so what the nature of the condition is, depend upon interpretation.
A "constructive" or "implied in law" condition is a condition that
is such because of a rule of law, rather than because of the actual
intention of the parties; it is ordinarily dictated by the sense of
justice of the court.45
Often it would be an arduous task to determine, with exactness
in detail, all the promises and conditions in a contract. But such a
detailed interpretation is not necessary. It is enough that the court
should find whether, in accordance with the intention of the parties,
the particular operative facts resulted in a loss by the testator of the
privilege of revoking his will or leaving his property in the way in
which he did. Why should it be necessary to determine just which
of the facts imposed the duty, or what would have been the result
(as determined by the contract) if the facts had been otherwise?
The English cases have generally been unsatisfactory in this
respect, indicating either that conditions are impossible and the
contract, if any, must contain a promise not to revoke regardless of
the turn of subsequent events, or that the contract should not be
enforced unless it is certain in every one of its terms, whether in-
volved in the case or not. 6 Dufour v. PereiraV is an exception;48 but
though few of the English cases escape publication, that is their
only reported case enforcing such a contract.
45For discussions of conditions in contracts, see RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS (Am. L. Inst. Tentative Draft No. 6, March 3o, 1929), C. 1o; 2
WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 663, ef seq.; Corbin, Conditions in the Law
of Contracts (I919) 28 YALE L. J. 739.
4'Gray v. Perpetual Trustee Co., [1928]A. C. 391, 139 L.T. (N. s.) 469; In re
Oldham, infra note 49; Stone v. Hoskins, 11905] P. 194 (19o5); Walpole v. Orford,
supra note Io; cf. Denyssen v. Mostert, supra note 8.
47Supra note 9.
4"The opinion, 2 HARG. JURID. ARG. at 3o8, shows that Lord Camden was not
bothered by his uncertainty as to just when the survivor lost the privilege of
revoking her will: "It may be revoked by joint consent clearly-by one alone, if
he give notice, I can admit."
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The will and surrounding circumstances in the case of In re Old-
ham49 indicated with unusual cledrness that the parties intended the
wife to be bound as survivor, to devise the bulk of her husband's
property to his relatives in accordance with the separate simultane-
ous mutual wills. 0 The court, however, expressed its "utmost regret"
that it could not enforce such a promise because all the terms of the
contract were not "certain and unequivocal" 1 and it was possible
to imagine some turns which the events might have taken (but
didn't) in which neither the parties nor the court would have
desired a binding contract. Said the court, "Supposing that the wife
had died first, and the husband, who was at the date of the wills
not yet sixty, had married again. It is- difficult to believe that he
agreed to a course that would prevent his making any testamentary
provision for his second wife... It is difficult to imagine that it was
the intention of the parties, when they made the mutual wills, that
the survivor should in no circumstances have power to alter the
trusts except by disposition inter vivos."
That failure to understand the possible variations in promises and
conditions has resulted in a few similar cases in this country rejecting
the contract as too harsh and not proved. Also there have been a
few cases with an argument consisting of the same erroneous major
premise: whenever there is a contract, it must contain unconditional
promises that no part of the wills would be revoked; a minor premise:
the evidence indicates that there was an agreement or compact (the
word "contract" is often studiously avoided); and the conclusion:
therefore there was a contract containing a promise which was
broken by the revocation. Thus the same false major premise may
lead to a decision either granting or denying specific performance.
These false arguments, together with a liberal sprinkling of conflict-
ing dogmatic rules of the Frazier v. Patterson variety, have resulted
in the prevalent belief that the American cases are a hopeless mass
of inconsistencies. However, the cases should be judged by their
decisions, not by the language of their opinions.
49132 L.T. (N.s.) 658, [1925] Ch. 75, 94 LJ. Ch. (N.s.) 148, 69 Sol. Jo. 193.
10The opinion states, at 66o, [1925] Ch. at 8o: "The husband and wife made,
dispositions of their property in practically identical terms, under what must, in
my opinion, be regarded as an agreement to do so."
51As to the contract, the court said, at 662-3, [1925] Ch. 87-8: "In order to
enforce the trust for which the plaintiff's counsel contend, I must be satisfied
that its terms are certain and unequivocal... I cannot build up a trust on con-
jecture... [T]hey may have considered that the survivor could be trusted to
give effect to what must have been known to be the wishes of both." As to Wal-
pole v. Orford, supra note Io, the court added: "He [Lord Loughborough] found
that there had been some agreement, but that it was impossible to ascertain
precisely and certainly its terms."
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Each decision is required to answer only one question: was the
particular contractual intention such as to create, under the actual
circumstances, the duty to devise in the manner claimed by the
promisee or beneficiary? When 'each answer to this question is
considered in the light of its own evidence, the law on this subject
appears much more consistent and satisfactory than many of the
opinions and writings would indicate.
The futility of an attempt to summarize those answers is apparent.
Each estate is a unique estate. There are many widely differing
types of arrangements, not only for devising those estates, but also
for limiting the privilege of changing the devises. In addition, the
main problem is to determine what contractual plan was used, and
the evidence in each case is both unique and complicated. When an
individual standard is applied, as here, the natural way to discuss
the problem is to take each case separately. Lack of space prevents
that. All that we can do here is to consider a few of the more com-
mon evidentiary facts, 2 one at a time, keeping in mind, however,
that a case of this type is never decided with the aid of only one
evidentiary fact.
In the usual case there may be five general types of evidence,
from a consideration of all of which the existence and terms of the
contract must be determined. They are: (i) a separate written
contract or other writing that satisfies the Statute of Frauds; (2) the
wills, including the form and expressions of contractual intent;
(3) surrounding circumstances; (4) oral statements of the parties
made with reference to the contract; and (5) the scheme of distri-
bution contained in the wills.
(i) It is unnecessary to call attention to the many advantages
of a written dontract stating the agreement in as much detail as
possible. But such a contract is not often broken, or if there is a
breach, the case seldom reaches the appellate court, and we have
only a few such cases reported.0
(2) The wills may state the terms of the contract as clearly as
a separate writing,M though in the reported cases the references
2
"Evidence" is used in this article in a broad sense to include evidentiary facts.
An "evidentiary fact" is a fact which is used for the purpose of aiding in the
proof of another fact.
13Buehrle v. Buehrle, 291 II. 589, 126 N.E. 539 (1920); Uniontown Reformed
Church v. Wise, supra note 13. See also Stewart v. Todd, supra note 3o, where
the contract of survivorship was executed some time before the mutual wills.
Compare Chase v. Stevens, supra note 30. For cases wherein there was a written
contract of survivorship but no wills, see Fleming v. Fleming, supra note 3o;
Eldred v. Warner, supra note 12.
1Rice v. Winchell, 285 Ill. 36, 12o N.E. 572 (1918); Brown v. Brown, supra
note 32; Warwink v. Zimmerman, 126 Kan. 619, 270 Pac. 612 (1928); Sage v.
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to the contract are usually rather indefinite. There may be some
slight mention of "contract", "agreement", or "consideration"."
There may be a statement that the wills or certain of the bequests
are to be revocable under certain conditions, which might indicate
that there was a promise not to revoke except as to those bequests
and under those conditions. 6 The different types of references are
innumerable; each must be given the weight it seems to deserve.
The testamentary scheme, where it is of value in proving the con-
tractual intent, might be included in this group as an implied refer-
ence, but it is discussed later as a separate type.
In addition to these references, there may be some evidentiary
value in the form of the wills. Frazier v. Patterson5, 7 finds in this a basis
of classification for some of its broad generalities or dogmatic rules.
Thus the rules for joint wills are quite different from those for
separate wills, and the reason is: "[T]here is no necessary inference
that the [separate] wills were the result of any mutual or reciprocal
agreement or understanding. Such [separate] wills might be exe-
cuted without either party knowing that the other had executed his
will; but where the parties execute their wills by the same instrument
[a joint will], it is not possible that such course could be adopted
without some previous understanding or agreement between them.
Each must necessarily know what disposition the other has made
of his property." Is that evidence of knowledge the only or even the
important difference? Nearly always there is ample proof in connec-
tion with separate wills (especially if simultaneous or twin) that each
knew of the provisions in the will of the other.58 There seem to be
further reasons for holding that the joint will has a greater evidentiary
value. The execution of one instrument by both testators indicates,
in at least a slight way, that they are thinking of a bilateral act
Sage, supra note 39; Robertson v. Robertson, 94 Miss. 645, 47 So. 675, 136 Am.
St. Rep. 589 (z9o8); Harris v. Harris, supra note 41.5 Schumaker v. Schmidt, supra note I3; Heller v. Heller, supra note 39. See
also Rastetter v. Honinger, supra note 39; Hermann v. Ludwig, i86 App. Div.
287, 174 N.Y. Supp. 469 (2d Dept. z919), aff'd, 229 N. Y. 544, 129 N.E. 908 (1920);
Ballard v. Ballard, 26 Ohio C. C. (N.s.) 490 (i916); In re Hoffert's Estate, 65 Pa.
Super. Ct. 515 (19z7). Where the attempted testamentary dispositions were in
the form of deeds and bills of sale, see Mueller v. Batcheler, supra note 3o .
51Such provisions were overlooked in In re Oldham, supra note 49, and In re
Rhodes Estate, 277 Pa. 450, 121 Atl. 327 (1923). Compare Uniontown Reformed
Church v. Wise, supra note 13.
57Supra note 19, at 86, 90 N. E. at 218.
58This is important only in that there would seldom be a contract creating the
duty not to revoke such wills if each did not know the contents of the other will.
But the converse does not necessarily follow.
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(contract), rather than only two separate unilateral acts (wills).
Also, the use of one instrument makes it more difficult for one testator
to revoke his will, 59 and the parties are probably conscious of that
practical restriction on revocation and may intend that either will
alone shall not be revoked. The results in the American reported
cases indicate that there might be a little to this distinction, but
not enough to explain, much less excuse, the dogmatic rules based
on it. In almost two-thirds of the joint will cases where the problem
was properly raised, the contract was enforced, while that was true
in less than one-half (slightly over two-fifths) of the cases where-
separate wills had been used.60
The cases might be grouped into smaller subdivisions based on
the form of the instrument, such as, separate wills grouped into
simultaneous and non-simultaneous,6 or into similar (twin) and
dissimilar;62 but the difference in evidentiary value appears to be
small.0
(3) The surrounding circumstances vary greatly from case to
case, and here again sound judgment must determine the weight
they should be given. As far as can be determined from the opinions,
some circumstances of considerable probative value have been
overlooked.64 Some not infrequent circumstances which may be
suggestive are: (a) the mutual exchange of wills, or their delivery
to the third party beneficiary;65 (b) the local custom as to use of these
instruments, especially as affected by a recent case limiting their
revocability; (c) the time elapsed since the execution (availability
of parol evidence); (d) an outside consideration furnished by the
59He can no longer revoke by physical act without interfering with the paper
on which is written the will of the other testator.
6
'See infra notes 78-94, 103, 104, where the types of wills are indicated.
61For non-simultaneous wills, see supra note 3o for cases where the contract
was enforced. For similar cases, but refusing to enforce a contract in favor of the
survivor, see Gould v. Mansfield, supra note I3; Robinson v. Mandell, supra
note 13.
6 2The similarity of the wills has often been considered important. See Stevens
v. Myers, 9I Ore. 3i4, 177 Pac. 37, 2 A. L. R. 1155 (1918).
63In re Cawley's Estate, supra note 13, and Beveridge v. Bailey, 22o N.W.
462, 868, 2o A.L.R. 619, 625 (S.D. 1928), considered that the joint wills in those
cases had less evidentiary value because some of the similar provisions were in
separate paragraphs. Compare Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385, 153
N.W. 56 (1915); Bower v. Daniel, i98 Mo. 289, 95 S.W. 347, 12'Prob. Rep. Ann.
34 (i9o6); Doyle v. Fischer, 183 Wis. 599, 198 N.W. 763, 33 A.L.R. 733 (I924).
6See infra notes 65, 68.
6Chase v. Stevens, supra note 3o; Chambers v. Porter, 183 N.W. 431 (Iowa
1921). But this was overlooked in Robinson v. Mandell, supra note 13.
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beneficiary;66 and (e) the relative values of the considerations6 7
(promised devises) of the two testators, considering not only the size
of each estate, but also the probability of the other testator receiving
it, as affected by their relative ages and conditions of health (life
expectancies)," and any conditions in the wills or promises.
(4) In some cases, the law allows evidence of the oral statements
of the parties with reference to the contract. There the witnesses
have occasionally agreed on something of value, but more often
their memories have been clouded by time, or they have seriously
disagreed.
Where the contract is not in writing, the question of the Statute
of Frauds is immediately raised if real property is involved. A few
cases have held that the will was a sufficient memorandum, even
though the contract was not expressly mentioned and even though
the wills were separate. 69 This possibility has been denied 0 or ignored
by most of the cases. There has been further disagreement in decid-
ing what amounts to sufficient performance to take the contract
out of the Statute in equity. Most courts have held that the death
of one leaving his will in force is sufficient as against the survivor.7'
6Mayfield v. Cook, supra note 28; Cox v. Hutto, supra note 3o; Chase v.
Stevens, supra note 3o; Chambers v. Porter, supra note 65; Torgerson v. Hauge,
supra note 29; Duvale v. Duvale, supra note I2; Corcoran v. Kennedy, 177 App.
Div. 63, 163 N.Y. Supp. 703 (3d Dept. 1917); In re McGinley's Estate, supra
note 41.
6tRolls v. Allen, 204 Calif. 604, 269 Pac. 45o (1928); Buchanan v. Anderson,
70 S. C. 454, 50 S.E. 12, IO Prob. Rep. Ann. 175 (i9O5); Walpole v. Orford,
supra note IO; cf. Rice v. Winchell and other cases infra note 97.
O8Corcoran v. Kennedy, supra note 66; Turnipseed v. Sirrine, supra note 12.
But this was not discussed in In re Oldham, supra note 49, nor in Klussman v.
Wessling, supra note 39.
6 Joint will: Larrabee v. Porter, 166 S.W. 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
Separate wills: Brown v. Johanson, 69 Colo. 4oo, 194 Pac. 943 (1920); Brown
v. Webster, 9o Neb. 591, 134 N.W. 185, 37 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1196 (1912); Harris v.
Morgan, 157 Tenn. 140, 7 S.W. (2d) 53 (1928).
See Schnebly, op. cit. supra note 24, at 779, n. 78, 79; Falk v. Fulton, 124 Kan.
745, 262 Pac. 1025 (1928); Cantrell v. Brannon, 16 S.W. (2d) 4oo (Tex. Civ. App.
1929).
70Gould v. Mansfield, supra note I3; Canada v. Ihmsen, supra note 37; In re
Edwall, supra note 36.
71Brown v. Johanson, supra note 69; Meador v. Manlove, supra note 29;
Carmichael v. Carmichael, supra note 12; Lugauer v. Husted, supra note 29;
Stuckey v. Truett, supra note 3o; Larrabee v. Porter, supra note 69; Doyle v.
Fischer, supra note 63. But see the discussion in Everdell v. Hill, supra note
I3, and the Statute in In re Weir, 134 Wash. 560, 236 Pac. 285 (1925). In Near
v. Shaw, 76 Misc. 3o3, 137 N.Y. Supp. 77 (Co. Ct. i912), the Statute was held
to be a good defense, though performance by the first to die was not mentioned.
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This partly accounts for the fact that a larger percentage of the con-
tracts have been enforced when the suit was brought by the third
party beneficiary after a revocation by the survivor, than when
brought by the survivor after a revocation by the first to die. Cer-
tainly, in this latter case, the mere execution of the wills was not
sufficient part performance. However, one court has held, as against
the representatives of the first to die, that the survivor had performed
sufficiently to avoid the statute by keeping her will in force during
the joint lives, the first to die having the benefit of the risk, which
was as valuable as a life insurance policy. Other courts have denied
that this was sufficient part performance.7 2
(5) The scheme of distribution may be of some value in determin-
ing the existence of the contract. As to one such scheme, Frazier v.
Patterson"3 states that "a joint will which is not reciprocal is simply
the individual personal will of each of the persons signing the same
and is subject to the same rules that would apply if the wills were
several", apparently meaning that there could not be, or at least
ordinarily would not be, a contract. Either interpretation is startling.
A promise to devise to a third person is good consideration; there
clearly could be a contract. And as for evidentiary value, the courts
appear to be more liberal in enforcing the third party beneficiary
provisions than the mutual ones. In fact, Frazier v. Patterson itself
contains three separate rules stating categorically that, while the
provision for the ultimate beneficiaries may be enforceable against
the survivor, the mutual provision is unenforceable, and each testator
(including the first to die) has the privilege of revoking during their
joint lives.7 4
There seems to be only one case where neither will contained
a provision for the other, and there the dictum of Frazier v. Patterson
was rejected and the contract was enforced.75 That case, moreover,
. 7"It will not do to say that she received no benefit, as the plaintiff did not die,
any more than it would lie in the mouth of a man who had paid his premium of
insurance with a note to say that there was a failure of consideration, as he did
not die, or his property was not burned." Turnipseed v. Sirrine, supra note 12,
at 577, 35 S.E. at 759. This was approved in Hermann v. Ludwig, supra note 55.
But contra, that it may be good consideration but not part performance of the
type to take it out of the Statute, see Gould v. Mansfield, supra note 13; Gooding
v. Brown, supra note 13; Hale v. Hale, supra note 13; In re Edwall, supra note 36;
Canada v. Ihmsen, supra note 37.
"Supra note 19, at 84, 90 N.E. at 217.
7 4Infra notes ioo, 101, 103, 104 to the effect that these rules, so far as they
purport to be absolute rules of law, are unsubstantiated and unsound.
"Wiliams v. Williams, supra note 4o, at 649, 96 S.E. at 751. Frazier v. Patter-
son was cited in a written opinion by the lower court as an authority for the
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illustrates a type of distribution that does tend strongly to prove a
contract existed. One testator, the husband, owned a large farm,
his wife owned a small one, and the two owned a third small one
jointly. In their joint will, the wife devised her farm to one grand-
child, they devised their farm to another grandchild, and the hus-
band devised his large farm to their other issue. If their affections
were not abnormal, that arrangement would indicate clearly that
each was preferring some of their descendants only because the other
had promised to prefer the others.76
A recent Tennessee case7 7 overcame a strong obstacle in the form
of prior decisions on the Statute of Frauds in order to enforce a
contract where the scheme of distribution was cogent evidence of
the contract. Two brothers and two sisters owned a farm in common,
and lived on it together. Only one, Elijah, was married, and he
had one daughter, the complainant. The four brothers and sisters
executed separate simultaneous wills, each devising his interest in the
farm to the survivors in fee, or if he should be the survivor, then to the
children of Elijah. Elijah was the first to die, and the other three
received the devise of his interest to them. Later they threatened
to revoke their wills and dispose of the property in such a way as
to defeat the complainant's expectancy. The court strongly sym-
pathized with the claim that there was a contract. Would Elijah
have devised his whole interest in the property to his brother and
sisters, excluding his own daughter, if they had not promised to leave
their interests, according to the wills, to that daughter and any other
children he might have? True, there might have been a condition
that any of the others might withdraw from the agreement in case of
marriage, but such an event did not occur.
enforcement of the contract, and it seems clear that the defendant strongly
contested that, and probably cited the dictum here being discussed. The Supreme"
Court, though admitting that that case involved a mutual will, insists that it
"may be safely regarded as an authority for the proposition that where reciprocal
testamentary provisions are made for the benefit of a third party, there is a
sufficient consideration for the contractual element in the will (assuming that
the contract itself is established) to entitle the beneficiary to enforce the same in
equity." Compare Robinson v. Mandell, supra note 13; McGuire v. McGuire,
supra note 12.
"For a similar case and very good opinion, see Doyle v. Fischer, supra note 63.
See also McGuire v. McGuire, supra note x2; Carmichael v. Carmichael, supra
note 12; Larrabee v. Porter, supra note 69; Prince v. Prince, 64 Wash. 552, 117
Pac. 255 (1911). But see In re Weir, supra note 71, controlled by a local statute.
"Harris v. .Morgan, 157 Tenn. 140, 7 S.W. (2d) 53 (9.28).
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FAIRNESS AND EQUALITY IN DISTRIBUTION
In each of these two cases, the fairness of the distribution under
the original wills and the unfairness of the attempted change may
indicate more that the testator who died first should have insisted
on a contract than that he did; but even if that is true, the con-
scious or unconscious influence on the court is certain to be great.
We all like fairness and equality; it is notoriously easy to find wit-
nesses who can remember important conversations to prove oral
contracts reaching those results; and it would be surprising if the
sympathy of the court-were not also aroused.
In the cases brought by the ultimate beneficiaries to enjoin or
nullify a revocation by the survivor, the scheme of final distribution
is only one item affecting the natural sympathy of the court or
entering into the determination of the decision. But some light may
be thrown upon its importance by grouping these cases according
to the plans of disposition at the death of the survivor and then
noting the decisions in the cases in each group.
There are eighteen cases involving wills by a husband and wife
which would produce an equal, or nearly equal, distribution among
all their children. In sixteen of these, a contractual right in the
beneficiaries was found and enforced.78 One of the other two per-
mitted the survivor, who remarried, to revoke as to one-third of his
property and to leave that part to his second wife, with whom he
lived six years;79 the other was similar to this except that the bulk
of the estate was devised to the second wife. 0
Where the husband and wife had no children, there are eight cases
involving wills which would give each set of relatives about one-half
7 Cases involving joint wills: Frazier v. Patterson, supra note i9; Campbell v.
Dunkelberger, supra note 63; Lewis v. Lewis, supra note 20; Bower v. Daniel,
supra note 63; Rastetter v. Honinger, supra note 39; Moore v. Moore, 198 S.W.
659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); Larrabee v. Porter, supra note 69; Williams v. Wil-
liams, supra note 4o; Doyle v. Fischer, supra note 63. Compare Gerbrich v.
Freitag, supra note 34, holding a questionable instrument to be a good will.
Cases involving separate wills: Brown v. Johanson, supra note 69; McGuire v.
McGuire, supra note 12; Carmichael v. Carmichael, supra note i2; Stephen v.
Myers, supra note 62; Prince v. Prince, supra note 76; Allen v. Boomer, supra
note 12 (two sets of children). Compare Kellogg v. White, io3 Misc. z67, z69
N.Y. Supp. 989 (Sup. Ct. i9x8), modified in 186 App. Div. 911, 172 N.Y. Supp.
548 (3d Dept. 1918), where the problem was not properly raised, but the court
held, by way of dictum, that there was no contract.
Wills not executed in fulfillment of contract: Stuckey v. Truett, supra note 3o
(beneficiaries were foster children with strong equities in their favor).
7"Separate wills: In re Arland,'sutpra note 29.
""Separate wills: Cooke v. Burlingham, io5 Misc. 675, i73 N.Y. Supp. 614
(Sup. Ct. i919), aff'd, 189 App. Div. 91i, 178 N.Y. Supp. 885 (2d Dept. i919).
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of the total estate (the distribution within each group not necessarily
being even). Of these, six enforced a contractual right in the bene-
ficiaries.8 ' One held that the survivor (wife) could still renounce
and take her statutory share, which was large because most of the
land was held jointly. 82 The other permitted the survivor to make
a new distribution among each set of relatives, though apparently
the equal division was retained."
Summarizing, in the twenty-six cases of equal distribution, the
contracts were enforced in twenty-two; the contracts were rejected
in only four, and in perhaps all of these the elements of equality
were counterbalanced by elements of unfairness. Compare the
decisions in those cases with the decisions in the cases in which the
distribution among the ultimate beneficiaries was unequal.
In the cases of wills by husband and wife, only two provided for
an unequal distribution among their children; but in both cases the
favored son was a party to the contract and furnished a valuable
consideration. For that reason the contracts were enforced8 4
There were four cases involving spouses, one or both of whom
had children by another marriage, and in at least three of these cases
the wills would result in an uneven distribution. The claimants
were unsuccessful in all four. 5
When there were no children, there are seven cases in which
the distribution was grossly unequal between the two sets of col-
lateral heirs. In five of these, the claim was rejected as not proved:8
in one, the contract was recognized; 7 and in the other, the beneficiary
$'Joint wills: Robertson v. Robertson, supra note 54; Deseumeur v. Rondel, 76
N.J. Eq. 394, 74 Ati. 703 (1909).
Separate wills: Meador v. Manlove, supra note 29; Tooker v. Vreeland, supra
note 36; Morgan v. Sanborn, supra note 29; Minor v. Minor, 2 Ohio N.P. (N.s.)
439 (1904).
8Joint will: In re Rhodes Estate, supra note 56.
13Separate wills: Wallace v. Wallace, supra note 3.8
'Joint will: Torgerson v. Hauge, supra note 29. Separate wills: Phillip v.
Phillip, 96 Misc. 471, II6 N.Y. Supp. 624 (Sup. Ct. i9i6).
8uJoint wills: Sargent v. Corey, supra note 28 (child born to survivor); Rolls v.
Allen, supra note 67; In re Hoffert's Estate, supra note 55. Compare Epperson v.
White, supra note 35, where the court refused probate to an instrument purport-
ing to be a joint will of this type.
Separate wills: Wanger v. Marr, 257 Mo. 482, 165 S.W. 1027 (1914) (entire will
not given).
Joint wills: Menke v. Duwe, supra note 23; Beveridge v. Bailey, supra note 63.
Separate wills: Klussman v. Wessling, supra note 39; Rice v. Winchell, supra
note 54; Sappingfield v. King, 49 Ore. lO2, 89 Pac. 142, 9o Pac. i5o, 8 L.R.A.
(N.s.) Io66, 12 Prob. Rep. Ann. 607 (1907).
87Mueller v. Batcheler, supra note 30 (no wills executed).
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had furnished consideration, and the court directed that, in a new
trial, the existence of the contract should be left to the jury.8 8
There are six cases involving wills by near relatives, such as sisters,
which would produce an unequal distribution among their common
relatives and perhaps friends. In only one of these was a contract
enforced,8 9 the claim being disallowed in the other five.90
Again summarizing, in the nineteen cases of unequal distribution,
the contracts were rejected in fourteen; a direction was made that
the problem be left to the jury in one; the contracts were enforced
in only four, and in at least two of them, the elements of inequality
were counterbalanced by elements of fairness.
There are ten other cases,9' but they can not readily be grouped
under factual headings. Three would naturally attract considerable
sympathy, and contracts were enforced. 2 The other seven are rather
neutral, or their provisions are doubtful; two were enforced, 9 and
five were not. 4
The high correlation between the natural sympathies and the
decisions is significant. In many of these cases it seems that, on
cold analysis, the plan of distribution has little probative value; yet
apparently it has a strong influence.
88Separate wills: In re McGinley's Estate, supra note 41.
89Joint will: Sherman v. Goodson's Heirs, 219 S.W. 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
90Joint will: In re Cawley's Estate, supra note 13.
Separate wills: Edson v. Parsons, supra note i3; Everdell v. Hill, supra note i3;
Near v. Shaw, supra note 7i; Wilson v. Gordon, 73 S.C. 155, 53 S.E. 79, iI Prob.
Rep. Ann. 6o6 (I9O5).
9
'An effort has been made to include all cases that can fairly be classed in this
group of cases wherein the final beneficiaries were seeking to prevent or nullify
a revocation by the survivors. At any rate, enough cases have been found to
warrant their mention here.
92Separate wills: Chase v. Stevens, supra note 30 (survivor had received money
from brother for support, after giving him her will devising all she did not use
to his heirs); Lugauer v. Husted, supra note 29 (foster child v. heirs in Germany);
Harris v. Morgan, supra note 77 (discussed in this connection). See also (no
wills were executed, and contracts were with beneficiaries rather than with each
other) Mayfield v. Cook, supra note 28; Cox v. Hutto, supra note 30.
3Joint wills: Baker v. Syfritt, supra note 39 (children by prior marriage of
first to die [wife] v. second wife of survivor); Kirtley v. Spencer, supra note 34
(a charity as claimant).
'Voint will: Buchanan v. Anderson, supra note 67 (relationship not stated).
Separate wills: Allen v. Bromberg, 163 Ala. 621, 5o So. 884 (1909) (contest
between charities); Uniontown ReformedChurch v.Wise, supra note 13(apparently
a charity as claimant); Flower v. Flower, 166 N.E. 914 (Ohio App. 1928) (relation-
ship not stated); In re Weir, supra -note 71 (either decision would favor one or
the other child).
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The direction of this influence must not be overlooked, or the
wrong inference drawn from that analysis of the cases. We can not
say that the scheme of distribution at the death of the survivor is
almost final in determining whether there was a contract. Each
case involved more than the mere question whether there was a con-
tract; it decided whether this particular survivor was under a con-
tractual duty to this particular third party beneficiary to devise
the property in question to him under these particular circumstances.
True, if a duty was found to exist, that necessarily involved the
existence of a contract. However, a decision that no such duty
existed might mean that there was no contract, or it might mean
that there was a contract, but that there was a condition in the
contract which under the particular operative facts, relieved the
survivor of the duty not to revoke. It is therefore necessary to
determine, not only whether a contract exists, but also what the
promises and conditions are.
In addition to the promise to devise, there will be the subsidiary
promise not to defeat the plan by making excessive gifts.15" In the
case of husband and wife, there might also be a promise not to
renounce and demand dower or the statutory share in lieu thereof.98
However, the survivor ordinarily will not attempt to renounce unless
the devise to him is less than his statutory share. In such a case
the consideration is apt to seem inadequate, and then it is very
difficult to convince the court of the existence of a contract that
would bind this survivor in this way.9 7
CONDITIONS IN THE CONTRACT
There may also be conditions in the contract; but the part they
play in these cases, though important, is often a silent one. In a
number of cases, some event, such as marriage by the survivor, 98
has occurred after the execution of the will and made its revocation
9S5ee cases supra note 40.
96Prince v. Prince, supra note 76.
9rKlussman v. Wessling, supra note 39; Rice v. Winchell, supra note 54;
Menke v. Duwe, supra note 23; -In re Rhodes Estate, supra note 56; cf. Rolls
v. Allen, supra note 67; In re Hoffert's estate, supra note 55; Buchanan
v. Anderson, supra note 67.
98For ordinary contract to devise cases see supra note 28. See also Sargent v.
Corey, supra note 28; Baker v. Syfritt, supra note 39; Lewis v. Lewis, supra
note 20; Deseumeur v. Rondel, supra note 8I; Near v. Shaw, supra note 71;
Cooke v. Burlingham, supra note 8o; In re Arland, supra note 29; Cf. Kloberg v.
Teller, supra note 28; Fleming v. Fleming, supra note 3o. For an interesting
compromise, involving community property, see Larrabee v. Porter, supra note
69; Wagnon v. Wagnon, 16 S.W. (2d) 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
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desirable; yet the evidence was such that a contract would have been
found to exist if the subsequent events had taken a different turn.
If the promise was not enforced in the actual case, the reason given
for such a decision should be that a contract existed, but that it
contained an express or constructive condition excusing the perfor-
mance of the promise. This true reason is seldom clearly stated.99
Sometimes, it is true, the opinion admits that there was a contract,
and refuses to enforce it because it would work a hardship under
the facts in the case. That is another way of stating that there is a
constructive condition. More commonly, the opinion insists that
there was no contract, usually adding that such a contract must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Such a case lacks
either clearness of perception or intellectual honesty, but it does
not cause serious legal confusion as it is based upon the interpreta-
tion of the facts in a field in which identical cases do not occur.
However, material improvement would result from an understand-
ing of the problems of conditions in contracts and a clear opinion
explaining the decision as based on such a condition.
In some cases the court has realized that, if the evidence is fairly
interpreted in harmony with other cases, a contract should be found
to exist. Yet the court has not wished to enforce the contract in
that case, or has not wished to establish a precedent for enforcing
such a contract under any intervening circumstances. Instead of
saying that in accordance with a condition in the particular con-
tract certain operative facts would relieve the promisor of the duty
to perform, some courts have apparently failed to understand the
possibility of conditions and have reached the result desirable
in that case by stating, as a rule of law, that various facts would
relieve the promisor in every case.
Some of the rules of Frazier v. PaUerson have resulted from such
a failure to understand the law of contracts. Thus, when that case
states that a joint and mutual will "becomes irrevocable after the
death of one of them [the testators] if the survivor takes advantage
of the provisions made by the other," it means that there is a condi-
tion in the contract that a duty on the part of the survivor to devise
his estate in accordance with the will shall arise only upon the oc-
currence of those operative facts, i.e., death of the other and accept-
ance of the bequest. Curiously enough, this case approves two
99 erhaps the clearest case on the problem is Canada v. Ihmsen, supra note 37,
at 449, 240 Pac. at 930, wherein it is stated: "It is not impossible, or even im-
probable, that some conditions were attached to the contract. The decedent
might have reserved the right to change her will upon change of circumstances..."
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other and somewhat inconsistent rules covering this same situation:
in the first, the final operative fact creating the duty is the death of
one of tl~em keeping his will in force, regardless of acceptance by
the survivor, "on the theory that the first that dies carries his part
of the contract into execution"; in the second, the final operative
fact is the death of one before either has notified the other of an
intent to revoke, as "neither of them could, during their joint lives,
revoke it secretly." 100
These three rules agree that, in general, the survivor is to be
bound, but either party is to have the privilege of revoking during
the joint lives. That may be the usual intent when the main object
is to make sure that the gift to the survivor, followed by his revoca-
tion, does not result in an uneven distribution at his death. But
there is certainly no rule of law requiring such a condition. In fact,
in the one case involving this type of mutual wills, the contract was
enforced against the first to die (at the suit of the ultimate beneficiary
who, it is true, had supported the testators for fifteen years as con-
sideration) even though both testators had attempted to revoke.' 10
These rules permitting either testator to revoke during the joint
lives are perhaps worded broadly enough to apply also to the wills
that are only reciprocal and contain no provision for a distribution
at the death of the survivor. As in such a case the survivor is not
to be bound, the mutual devise in his will having lapsed,0 2 these
10OSupra note 19, at 85, 90 N.E. at 218, for all three citations. The condition
covered by the second rule (either could revoke secretly during the joint lives),
if it existed, would make the promises illusory during the joint lives (see supra
note 43). The analysis of this article will not sufferif this one condition were held
to be an improper one. However, the courts seem to have considered it a proper
condition. The theory on which it is done is perhaps not important. If the
arrangement is treated as mutual offers for unilateral contracts (each testator
offers to devise his property in a certain way, as survivor, if the other accepts
by dying with his will in force), we have the question whether the death of the
offeree can be made the final operative fact for the acceptance of the offer.
Professor Costigan, op. cit. supra note i at 251, et. seg., in a similar type of case,
calls the remedy a "constructive trust". However, a trust will not be created
here or an election required unless there was a promise. Gray v. Perpetual
Trustee Co., supra note 46. It seems enough that the promise is enforced, and
that it may contain conditions of the type herein discussed. See Chase v. Stevens,
supra note 3o.
'
01Torgerson v. Hauge, supra note 29. Compare the cases cited supra note 30.
The failure to execute the will may be a breach of the promise similar to the
revocation of the will, and in these cases also the contracts were enforced.
102This is true though the will was not revoked and a statute raised a presump-
tion against lapsing. Anderson v. Anderson, supra note 3o; cf. Bynum v. Bynum,
supra note 13; Sappingfield v. King, supra note 86.
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rules would here be equivalent to a statement that there could be
no contract. That is not true; the most that can be said is that there
is a prejudice against this type of contract because of its gambling
nature, or that the Statute of Frauds often prevents recovery. In
twenty-nine cases the survivor attempted to enforce such a contract;
he was successful in only twelve, 0 3 and unsuccessful in seventeen104
SuMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The problems arising under these multi-wills have been discussed
as two separate problems: (i) the effect of the instruments as wills,
to be determined by the ordinary law of wills, and (2) the effect
of the arrangement as a contract, to be determined by the ordinary
law of contracts. That is certainly the way the subject matter has
been handled by the vast majority of the courts. Since the validity
of the instruments as authorized types of wills has been established,
the problems nearly always arise upon a consideration of the effect
of a revocation. This is the contract problem, and it is usually
raised on a bill or cross-bill for specific performance, or other bill
setting up the equities under the contract. In order to emphasize
the separation between the two problems, the statement is often
made that the wills are revocable, but a revocation may be a breach
of the contract.' ° In other words, the testator has the power to
103Joint will: Hermann v. Ludwig, supra note 55.
Separate wills: Stewart v. Todd, supra note 3o; Chambers v. Porter, supra note
65; Wright v. Wright, supra note 4o; Brown v. Webster, supra note 69; Cor-
coran v. Kennedy, supra note 66; Kloberg v. Teller, supra note 28; Turnipseed v.
Sirrine, supra note 12. See also Duvale v. Duvale, supra note 12.
No wills executed: Eldred v. Warner, supra note i2; Green v.. Whaley, supra
note 3o; Fleming v. Fleming, supra note 30 (but not effective to reduce wife's
statutory share).
04 Joint wills: Schumaker v. Schmidt, supra note I3. The leading English case
is Stone v. Hoskins, supra note 46. 1
Separate wills: Robinson v. Mandell, supra note I3; Coveney v. Conlin, 20
App. D.C. 303 (1902); Gould v. Mansfield, supra note i3; Howells v. Martin,
ioi N.J. Eq. 275, 137 Atl. 565 (1927); Drischler v. Van Den Henden, supra
note i3; Gooding v. Brown, supra note i3; McLean v. Clark, 118 Misc. 284,
I93 N. Y. Supp. 113 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Blaine v. Richardson, 193 N. Y. Supp.
612 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Kingsbury v. Kingsbury, 120 Misc. 362, i98 N. Y. Supp. 512
(Sup. Ct. 1923); Lally v. Cronen, 247 N. Y. 58, 159 N. E. 723 (1928), rehearing
denied, 247 N. Y. 575, i6I N. E. 188 (1928); Dicks v. Cassels, 100 S.C. 341, 84
S.E. 878 (i915); Hale v. Hale, supra note i3; McClanahan v. McClanahan, 77
Wash. 138, 137 Pac. 479 (1913); In re Edwall, supra note 36; Canada v. Ihmsen,
supra note 37.
No wills executed: Izard v. Middleton, supra note 13.
105See supra notes 32, 36. Compare Allen v. Bromberg, supra note 36, and
Estate of Rolls, supra note 36, with Allen v. Bromberg, supra note 94, and Rolls
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revoke, but because of the contract he may not have that privilege;
he is under a duty not to revoke. Where the transactions are intelli-
gently treated in this manner, the intention of the parties is carried
out and a very desirable high degree of flexibility is obtained, as the
public policy limitations on types of promises in contracts are rela-
tively few.
The civil law of some parts of Europe has tended to crystallize
in this field of the law. Definite rules have often been developed,
sometimes as absolute rules of law, and sometimes as presumptions.
Since the evidence is usually not very convincing, the effect of either
has been to limit the types of promises permitted in the contract.
At the same time the two problems have often been mixed, resulting
in a type of will whose revocability, as a probate problem, is deter-
mined by rules differing from those applied to the ordinary will.
That gradual degeneration has led the courts away from a sound
inquiry into the intention of the parties, and has taken away the
most valuable characteristic, flexibility.
A start in the same direction can be seen in the cases from a few
of the states. One cause may be the lack of a sound understanding
of the law of contracts, especially as regards conditions. Another
cause may be the type of relief given in some states. The usual
decree merely requires the heirs or devisees to convey to the promisee
or beneficiary. In one variation from the normal, the decree enjoins
the probating of the revoking instrument. This is done in Illinois
and has been done in California."0 6 While this may be a short cut
and merely a matter of form, it is significant that Illinois has been
the leader in dogmatism and confusion, producing both Frazier v.
Patterson and Martin v. Helms.' Pennsylvania handles the prob-
lem in a still more unfortunate manner. There the two problems
are treated as one and solved by the probate court.0 8 While this
has the claimed advantage of being still more of a short cut, 09 it
has the distinct disadvantage of confusing the issues and perhaps
v. Allen, supra note 67. See Brown v. Brown, supra note 32, applying the doctrine
of lapsed legacies. Compare In re Lage, i9 F. (2d) i53 (N. D. Iowa, 1927),
holding that after the death of one of the testators the rights of the ultimate
beneficiary were still contingent and would not pass to his trustee in bankruptcy.
'0Frazier v. Patterson, supra note i9; Klussman v. Wessling, supra note 39;
Rice v. Winchell, supra note 54; Chase v. Stevens, supra note 30. But compare
Estate of Rolls, supra note 36; Rolls v. Allen, supra note 67.
1073i9 Ill. 281, x49 N.E. 770 (1925). See discussion infra p. 388.
'Q$0 n re Cawley's Estate, supra note 13; In re McGinley's Estate, supra note 4I;
Sherman v. Goodson's Heirs, supra note 89. See Lewis v. Lewis, supra note 20.
'
09See Goddard, op cit. supra note I, at 686.
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of leaving the problem to a common law jury. It is feared that a
spread of these methods of handling the problems might result
in a gradual tendency toward crystallization in line with the dog-
matic rules of Frazier v. Patterson. The best antidote for this is a
better understanding of conditions as applied to the contracts. It
must be admitted that a court confronted by a problem new to that
jurisdiction is more apt to be attracted by the apparent certainty
of the dogmatic rules than by a confused discussion of the contract
with not even a hint that the case involves a condition.
The distinction between the will and the contract must be kept
clearly in mind in considering conditions. It is common to imply
conditions in contracts. But in wills the condition must be expressly
stated in the will. The confusion of the two has led the Illinois
and Oklahoma Courts into a radical departure from settled will and
contract principles in two very recent cases.
Perhaps the forerunner of these cases was Peoria Humane Society
v. McMurtrie.n0 In that case, the joint will, executed by a mother
and her son, contained an express condition: at the death of the
survivor, the property of both was to be disposed of in a certain
manner only "if no individual will has been made". The son mar-
ried, executed a new will, and died. Later the mother died, never
having revoked the joint will. That will was refused probate as
her will, the opinion clearly stating that the will was expressly
conditional and the condition did not happen. That case agrees with
well settled testamentary law."' However, it has been cited for the
proposition that marriage by one party to a joint will revokes not
only his own but also the other testator's will."2 That is clearly a
misinterpretation of the case, and is unsound law."3
110229 Ill. 519, 82 N.E. 319 (1907).
"'For other conditional joint wills, see American Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v.
Eckhardt, 331 Ill. 261, 162 N.E. 843 (1928); Rogers v. Mosier, 121 Okda. 213,
245 Pac. 36 (1926) (same will as in Burkhart v. Rogers, infra note II5). Wills
only reciprocal are in effect conditional; each is to be the will of that testator only
if he dies before the other testator. Supra note 102. Compare In re Raine, I
Swa. & Tr. 144, 6 W. R. 816 (I858), where the testators owned property jointly,
and the "joint will" was to be only the will of the survivor.
112 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 24, at 155, n. 12; COSTIGAN, CASES ON WILLS
(2d. ed. 1929) 352, n. 34. But see a correct discussion by this latter author in op.
cit. supra note I, at 248, n. 21.
"'In re Anderson, 16 Ariz. I85, 141 Pac. 723 (1914); Lansing v. Haynes, 95
Mich. 16, 54 N.W. 699, 35 Am. St. Rep. 545 (1893); Matter of Goldsticker, 123
App. Div. 474, lO8 N.Y. Supp. 489 (Ist Dept. 19o8), aft'd, 192 N.Y. 35, 84 N.E.
581, 18 L.R.A. (N.s.) 99, 15 ANN. CAS. 66 (19o8); Hinckley v. Simmons, 4 Ves.
Jr. I6o, 31 Eng. Repr. 83 (1798). See also Underwood v. Myer, 146 S.E. 896
(W. Va. 1929). Compare the cases where the survivor remarries, supra note 98.
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
Next came another Illinois case, Martin v. Helms."4 There a
joint will was drawn for a husband and wife, providing only that
all the property of the first to die should go to the survivor. The
husband properly executed the will, but an innocent technical
error was committed which rendered the wife's attempted execution
invalid. The husband died first, and when his heirs opposed the
probate of the joint will, the court upheld their contention that
the error in execution by the wife rendered the will invalid as to the
husband. From the Peoria Humane Society case is quoted the state-
ment: "It is clear [from the express terms of the will] that the makers
intended that the portion of the will in question should take effect
as the will of both or neither." With the aid of the rules of Frazier
v. Patterson, this is corrupted into the remarkable statement:
"Joint, mutual, and reciprocal wills are made pursuant to an agree-
ment and understanding and must take effect as to both parties or
neither."
Those cases are sufficient authority for the Oklahoma court to
hold, in Burkhart v. Rogers,"5 that where the joint will of one of the
testators would not have been entirely effective (as a will) had he
been the first to die, because of a forced pretermitted heir, it was
invalid as the will of the other.
Where the Peoria Humane Society case enforces an express condi-
tion in the will, these cases imply a condition and enforce it. This
was not necessary to reach substantial justice in either case. If the
testators did not intend a contract requiring that the property be
disposed of according to the proposed wills, the failure to execute
the will would seem to be no worse than a secret revocation. If, as
the court held, there was an enforceable contract to devise, the failure
to execute a will effective to carry out the promised devise was merely
a breach of the contract, and the other testator is adequately pro-
tected by the contract, the same as if there had been a good execu-
tion. followed by a secret revocation."' But each of the opinions
indicate that either an ineffective execution or a secret revocation
"
4Supra note 107, at 287, 149 N.E. at 771.
"5134 Okla. 219, 273 Pac. 246 (1928).
n8Bynum v. Bynum, supra note 13. For cases enforcing such a contract, see
cases supra note IO3. A forced pretermitted heir will take subject to such a
contract right. Torgerson v. Hauge, supra' note 29. For cases enforcing the
contract though the wills had not been executed, see supra note 30. The court,
in Burkhart v. Rogers, supra note 115, based its decision on the existence of a
contract. Why can not the defeated proponents of the will now ask for specific
performance of the contract? The same question might be asked in Martin v.
Helms, supra note 107.
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by one testator would result in a revocation of the will of the other.
The law seems too well settled to justify such opinions," 7 but they
may be one development of a crystallized law of joint and mutual
wills ignoring the intention of the parties as well as the law of both
contracts and wills."" Let us hope that a clearer understanding of
the law of contracts as applied to these cases will check the tendency
in this direction.
"
7Bynum v. Bynum, supra note 13; In re Cole's Will, 171 N.C. 74, 87 S.E. 962
(i916). Compare the claim in Underwood v. Myer, supra note 113. See cases
and notes cited supra notes io5, i16.
UsCompare 3 GA. ANN. CODE (Park, 1914) § 3830 (3256): "Mutual wills may
be made either separately or jointly, and in such case the revocation of one is
the destruction of the other." For other statutes, see Bordwell, Statute Law of
Wills (1928) 14 IowA L. REv. I, 34- It would seem that, except for the Georgia
Code, these statutes merely state the common law. But see Rolls v. Allen, supra
note 67.
